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I. INTRODUCTION
Under existing California law, one who demands money from a
female victim, and who thereafter "helps" her upon a bed and
criminally assaults her, has committed the crime of aggravated kid-
napping.' As such, the activity so described is, and has been held,
sufficient to warrant the imposition of the death penalty. Section 209
of the California Penal Code provides:
Any person who . . . kidnaps . .. any individual to commit
robbery ... shall suffer death or shall be punished by imprison-
ment... for life without possibility of parole... in cases in which
the person . . . subjected to such kidnaping suffers . . . bodily
harm, or shall be punished by imprisonment.., for life with possi-
bility of parole in cases where such person or persons do not suffer
bodily harm.
2
It is difficult to conceive a situation in which the victim of a robbery
does not make some movement under the duress occasioned by force
or fear. In their interpretation of this statute, the California courts
have stated that it is the fact of forceful movement, not the distance
moved, which constitutes the statutory kidnapping. Hence, the
coerced movement of a robbery victim, no matter how slight the
distance, would conceivably be sufficient to place the typical robbery
within the scope and provisions of the aggravated kidnapping
statute.
Then too, the simple taking of any article of personal property at
any time before, during or after a sexual or other type of assault by
its perpetrator, accompanied by movement of the victim, has been
held sufficient to constitute kidnapping-for-robbery, thus bringing
into play the penalties of death or life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole. This would be true even though the robbery
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1 CAL. PEN. CODE § 207 (West 1955) (enacted 1872, as amended, 1905 Stat. 653,
ch. 493, § 1) [hereinafter cited as § 207].
2 CAL. PEN. CODE § 209 (West 1955) (added 1901 Stat. 98, ch. 83, § 1, as
amended, 1933 Stat. 1757, ch. 685, § 1; 1933 Stat. 2617, ch. 1025, § 1; 1951 Stat.
4167, ch. 1749, § 1) [hereinafter cited as § 209].
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was ancillary to a more dominant purpose; i.e., a mere afterthought
in the mind of the actor. Furthermore, if bodily harm is suffered by
the victim, the death penalty may be invoked at the discretion of
the jury or trial judge. Since rape has been construed by the courts
to be within the definition of bodily harm, section 209 permits
giving the death penalty to one who has committed rape, if this
same person took, or attempted to take some de minimus article of
personal property. Yet, if this same person were charged under the
rape statute, his sentence could be as short as one year (five years
if the victim is under eighteen).'
Admittedly, such a statute goes beyond the common law defini-
tion of kidnapping. In its present form, section 209 becomes a
potent weapon in the arsenal of the district attorney when he
evaluates his options in any robbery or rape prosecution. As pointed
out by Justice Carter:
The prosecuting attorney is given the sole and arbitrary power to
determine whether a person shall suffer life imprisonment without
possibility of parole or even death on one hand, or, in the case
of robbery in the second degree, as little as one year's imprisonment.
It all depends on the charge he chooses, at his whim or caprice, to
make against the accused. If he charges both robbery and kidnapping
and the defendant is convicted of both crimes, he must suffer the
greater punishment provided for kidnapping, or, if he wishes, he
may charge kidnapping alone and likewise obtain the extreme
penalty. However, he may charge robbery alone, and, in case of a con-
viction, lesser punishment would follow. All these things could
occur on the identical set of facts which establish only robbery ....
It is not to be supposed that the Legislature intended to place any
such drastic and arbitrary power in the hands of the district attorney. 4
A worthwhile inquiry can be made whether this law as it exists
now, as it has been interpreted, and as it is now being enforced,
genuinely reflects the intent of the legislature and seeks justice in
our society. Should the slight movement of robbery victims within
their residence, or place of business or employment by the perpetra-
tors of a robbery constitute aggravated kidnapping in California?
On many occasions, the California Supreme Court has held that it
does. Should a simple civil assault, i.e., an unconsented to touching,
constitute "bodily harm"? Some of the cases lend themselves to
3 CAL. PEN. CODE § 264 (West 1955) (enacted 1872, as amended, 1913 Stat. 213,
ch. 123, § 1; 1923 Stat. ch. 271, ch. 130, § 1; 1952 Stat., 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 23, § 1).




such an interpretation. Is this statute and all of its ramifications
necessary, reasonable and desirable within the overall context of our
penal system? A critical analysis of the current state of the law and
a concrete proposal to remedy this situation would seem in order.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Preliminary to an historical evaluation of section 209, it is helpful
to look to the history of kidnapping in general. Simple kidnapping
is defined in California by section 207:
Every person who forcibly steals, takes, or arrests any person in this
state, and carries him into another country, state, or county, or into
another part of the same county, or who forcibly takes or arrests any
person, with a design to take him out of this state, without having
established a claim, according to the laws of the United States, or
of this state, or who hires, persuades, entices, decoys, or seduces by
false promises, misrepresentations, or the like, any person to go
out of this state, or to be taken or removed therefrom, for the pur-
pose and with the intent to sell such person into slavery or involun-
tary servitude, or otherwise to employ him for his own use, or to the
use of another, without the free will and consent of such persuaded
person; and every person who, being out of this state, abducts or
takes by force or fraud any person contrary to the law of the place
where such act is committed, and brings, sends, or conveys such per-
son within the limits of this state, and is afterwards found within
the limits thereof, is guilty of kidnaping.5
The punishment established for simple kidnapping and set forth
in section 208 is imprisonment in the state prison for not less than
one nor more than 25 years.3
The "aggravated" kidnapping statute, the subject of this article,
is expressed in section 209:
Any person who seizes, confines, inveigles, entices, decoys, abducts,
conceals, kidnaps or carries away any individual by any means what-
soever with intent to hold or detain, or who holds or detains, such
individual for ransom, reward or to commit extortion or to exact
from relatives or friends of such person any money or valuable thing,
or any person who kidnaps or carries away any individual to commit
robbery, or any person who aids or abets any such act, is guilty of a
felony and upon conviction thereof shall suffer death or shall be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life without possi-
bility of parole, at the discretion of the jury trying the same, in cases
5 CAL. PEN. CODE § 207 (West 1955).
6 CAL. PEN. CODE § 208 (West 1955) (enacted 1872, as amended, 1923 Stat. 486,
ch. 238, § I).
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in which the person or persons subjected to such kidnaping suffers
or suffer bodily harm or shall be punished by imprisonment in the
state prison for life with possibility of parole in cases where such
person or persons do not suffer bodily harm.
Any person serving a sentence of imprisonment for life without pos-
sibility of parole following a conviction under this section as it read
prior to the effective date of this act shall be eligible for a release
on parole as if he had been sentenced to imprisonment for life with
possibility of parole.7
California has also enacted section 236 of the Penal Code con-
cerning false imprisonment, defining this crime as "the unlawful
violation of the personal liberty of another."8 The maximum
penalty for a violation of this statute is a 500 dollar fine, or one
year in jail, or both. If either "violence, menace, fraud or deceit," is
employed, the maximum sentence increases to two years, with
a minimum sentence of one year.'
Section 207, enacted in 1872, codified the common law definition
and principle of kidnapping. California, prompted by legislation in
other states and by a series of aggravated state-wide kidnappings,
enacted Penal Code section 209 in 1901, to punish specifically kid-
napping for ransom or extortion. Robbery was also included be-
cause at that time the code definition of extortion was limited to
taking with consent.10
Historically, the crime of kidnapping has existed from before
the time of Christ. The Old Testament defined kidnapping as the
stealing and the selling of a man, and fixed the penalty at death."
7 CAL. PEN. CODE § 209 (West 1955).
S CAL. PEN. CODE § 236 (West 1955) (enacted 1872). Similar legislation dealing
with a related problem of child stealing may be found in CAL. PEN. CODE § 278 (West
1955); CAL. PEN. CODE § 279 (West Supp. 1966).
9 CAL. PEN. CODE § 237 (West 1955) (enacted 1872, as amended, 1901 Stat. 53,
ch. 49, § 1).
10 CAL. PEN. CODE § 518 (West 1955) (enacted 1872, as amended, 1939 Stat.
2017, ch. 601, § 1).
11 Exodus 21:16; see Deuteronomy 24:7. Blackstone in his discussion of the crime
makes direct reference to the Roman plagium and the Jewish biblical law. Kidnapping,
being the forcible abduction or stealing away of man, woman or child from
their own country, and selling them into another, was capital by the Jewish
law. "He that stealeth a man, and selleth him, or if he be found in his hand,
he shall surely be put to death." So likewise, in the civil law, the offense of
spiriting away and stealing men and children, which was called plagum and
the offenders plagiarii, was punished with death. This is unquestionably a
very heinous crime, as it robs the king of his subjects, banishes a man from
his country, and may in its consequences be productive of the most cruel and
disagreeable hardships; and therefore the common law of England has punished
it with fine, imprisonment and pillory.
4 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 219 (Dawson, First Edition Reprint, 1966).
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As it developed in Bnglish common law, kidnapping involved the
offense of taking a person out of the country. It was distinguished
from false imprisonment where the subject was removed from the
jurisdiction of the King, thereby depriving the Crown of one of
its subjects and the accompanying feudal obligations and incidents
pertaining thereto. Whereas, if the perpetrator merely confined
the subject, a different offense and a lesser penalty was prescribed.
Therefore, all the elements of false imprisonment were present in
common law kidnapping plus the additional element of removal
from the country. 2
The original enactment of section 207 embodied the common law
concept of kidnapping but expanded the scope of the asportation
element to include removal to a different county. This was further
modified in 1905 when the phrase "or into another part of the same
county" was added to counteract the decision of Ex parte Keil.'8
In that case, the victim had been taken 26 miles from Los Angeles to
Catalina Island. Although the island was outside the territorial
waters of the United States, it was considered to be part of Los
Angeles County, therefore the victim had not been taken out of the
"same county." The legislature added the new phrase, indicating
that it considered the substantial movement in the Keil case sufficient
to constitute kidnapping. Nevertheless, the legislature failed to
indicate the extent of this movement. It should also be noted that
at the time of this amendment, section 236, dealing with false impris-
onment, was not modified in any manner. Since false imprisonment
is the unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another and calls
for a lesser punishment than simple kidnapping, it would appear
that the legislature intended section 236 to provide a punishment
for transgressions which were not encompassed by the provisions
of section 207. In the Keil case, since the victim had been taken
more than 20 miles across ocean waters and held on an island for
several days, it is understandable that the legislature would intend
the kidnapping statute to cover this type of factual situation.
Section 209 was enacted in 1901 and, as differentiated from
section 207, it had no basis in the common law and was thought
to be an aggravated false imprisonment statute. Prior to its amend-
ment in 1933, asportation was considered a necessary element of
the offense and the few cases tried under this section prior to the
12 Doss v. State, 220 Ala. 30, 123 So. 231 (1929).
1S 85 Cal. 309, 24 P. 742 (1890).
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amendment fulfilled this requirement. In 1933, however, utilizing
almost the entire language as contained in the federal kidnapping
statute, which subsequently became known as the Lindbergh Law,
the California legislature used the words "seized, confined, inveigle"
to describe the nature of the offense, but omitted the language re-
quired by the federal statute of "whoever shall knowingly transport
or cause to be transported, or aid or abet in the transporting .... 14
Thus, it may be that California in amending section 209 attempted
to eliminate the requirement of asportation, although the federal
statute upon which it was based did not include such nonmobile
conduct within its purview. For the first time, therefore, any sta-
tionary robbery could be considered violative of the kidnapping
statute. Such a result was probably never intended by the legislature.
Thus, Penal Code section 209, prior to 1951, was violated by
"[e]very person who seizes, confines, inveigles, entices, decoys,
abducts, conceals, kidnaps or carries away any individual by any
means whatsoever with intent to hold or detain or who holds and
detains, such individual for ransom, reward or to commit extortion
or robbery.. . ."15 Hence, mere detention during a robbery appeared
to be actionable under the statute. The California Supreme Court
so held in People v. Knowles,'6 decided in 1950. There the defen-
dant had merely detained his victim in order to rob a clothing store,
but this detention was held a sufficient act and no movement of the
victim was necessary to complete the crime of kidnapping. The
court held that the 1933 amendment abandoned the requirement
of moving the victim to characterize the offense,' 7 and if bodily
harm in fact thereafter occurred, the defendant was susceptible to
the death penalty or life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole. The furor raised by this decision, coupled with the forceful
dissenting opinion of Justices Edmonds and Carter, prompted the
enactment of the 1951 amendment.
The amended portion deleted the language relative to the "hold-
ing and detaining" of the victim and inserted the phrase "or any
person who kidnaps to commit robbery." It thereafter became the
court's duty to analyze the effect of this amendment. Among the
cases in which the California Supreme Court interpreted the new
14 Act of June 22, 1932, ch. 271, 47 Stat. 326. This statute was subsequently
amended by the Lindbergh Act, ch. 301, 48 Stat. 781 (1934). The language quoted,
however, remained the same.
15 CAL. PFN. CODE § 209 (West 1955) (historical note).
16 35 Cal. 2d 175, 217 P.2d 1 (1950).
17 Id. at 180, 217 P.2d at 4.
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amendment were People v. Chessman18 and People v. Wein.19
Rather than utilize the authorities describing the classic definition
of asportation as enumerated in common law kidnapping, the court
held in both the Chessman and Wein cases that "[i]t is the fact,
not the distance, of forcible removal which constitutes kidnap-
ping,"' thereby virtually undoing the intended effect of the amend-
ment. In the author's view therein lies the prime difficulty attending
the enforcement of section 209. The decision in the Chessman case
provided the prosecutors a latitude not contemplated by the legisla-
ture, that is, enabling prosecutors to charge the accused with a crime
of robbery which carries a minimum penalty of one year,2 or with
section 209 which carries a maximum punishment of death or a
minimum penalty of life imprisonment on approximately the same
facts. The California Supreme Court admitted that mere detention
alone would no longer be sufficient but that any movement whatso-
ever would still bring the perpetrator within the purview of the sec-
tion. The Wein case further crystalized the Chessman decision and
thus the amendment, instead of obviating the problems raised by
the Knowles case, actually had little practical effect.
III. DEFECTS OF PENAL CODE SECTION 209
Preliminary to any logical proposals, it is necessary to identify
and examine the individual problems involved in the present form
of section 209. These can generally be broken down into four prob-
lem areas:
A. The problem of asportation.
B. The problem of the requisite intent and when it must arise.
C. The problem of the scope and definition of "bodily harm."
D. The problem of penalties.
Appropriate to this discussion, each of the above problems will be
treated separately, examining the present wording of the statute
and how the courts have interpreted it.
A. Asportation
One of the initial considerations involved in any kidnapping
situation is the removal of the victim. In order to discuss the element
18 38 Cal. 2d 166, 238 P.2d 1001 (1951).
:L 50 Cal. 2d 383, 326 P.2d 457 (1958).
20 38 Cal. 2d at 192, 238 P.2d at 1017; 50 Cal. 2d at 400, 326 P.2d at 466.
21 CAL. PEN. CODE § 213 (West 1955).
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of asportation required for a violation of section 209, it is necessary
to look also to the simple kidnapping statute, section 207. As the
statute was originally enacted it required an asportation "into
another country, state, or county," which in most cases would
probably amount to a substantial distance. However, the statute was
amended in 190522 and the words "or into another part of the same
county" were added. The question then arose as to what con-
stituted movement into another part of the same county. The argu-
ment that the legislature intended that the 1905 amendment required
"movements over considerable distances" was rejected in People v.
Phillips,2 where the court stated "that to read those words into the
1905 amendment would import into the statute a hazardous element
of uncertainty. What is a 'considerable' distance ?,,24 In the Phillips
case the defendant had taken a child from her bedroom, along a
corridor, down fourteen steps to a back door, and then fifteen feet
into the back yard. The court held that this was sufficient asportation
under section 207, and cited People v. Loignon,25 for the statement,
"it is the fact, 'not the distance, of forcible removal which constitutes
kidnaping in this state.' " In the Loignon case the defendant pulled
a seven year old boy into his car and started the motor, at which
point the boy leaped from the car and escaped. The defendant argued
this conduct could not constitute the crime of kidnapping. He con-
tended that there was no proof of any attempt to remove the alleged
victim from one part of the county to another, that the words "other
part" of the county as used in the statute are " 'too vague, indefinite
and uncertain,' " and that it could not be determined whether this
means " 'a few inches away, across the street, around the corner, or
into another political subdivision of the county.' ",20 The court
stated that the defendant misconceived the issue and cited People v,
Chessman27 for the statement that it is the fact, "not the distance,
of forcible removal which constitutes kidnaping in this state."
Since the Chessman case was decided under section 209 and not
section 207, the court in effect said that there is no distinction be-
tween the element of asportation required for kidnapping-for-
robbery and simple kidnapping. This presents the question whether
there should be such a distinction, and whether the legislature
intended such a distinction to exist.
22 1905 Stat. 653, ch. 493, § 1.
2 173 Cal. App. 2d 349, 343 P.2d 270 (1959).
24 Id. at 352, 343 P.2d at 272.
25 160 Cal. App. 2d 412, 325 P.2c1 541 (1958).
26 Id. at 421, 325 P.2d at 546.
27 38 Cal. 2d 166, 192, 238 P.2d 1001, 1017 (1951).
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An affirmative answer to both of these questions was advanced
by the defense in the Phillips case. The defendant claimed that
since the legislature in 1933 had "broadened" the provisions of
section 209 and did not amend section 207, it meant that these
should be treated separately, and that there was no intent to
"broaden" section 207. This argument was rejected by the court.
However, weight can be added to the above argument by noting
the fact that the legislature directly modified the asportation element
of section 209 in 1951, while not making any reference to section
207. The problem area which developed because of the Chessman
case will be discussed after a comment on the more recent decisions
under section 207.
In People v. Rieh,28 the defendant put forth the theory that there
could be no kidnapping because the transportation was within the
area in which the victim himself was intending to travel. The court
rejected this contention by stating that "under section 207 only
forcible taking and carrying is necessary without regard for dis-
tance, route taken, or area covered."' 9 For this rule the court cited
Chessman, decided under 209, and also Phillips and Loignon, both
of which had quoted Chessman for their authority.
The broad language used in the above cases to describe the ele-
ment of asportation has been severely limited in the 1961 supreme
court case of Cotton v. Superior Court.30 Here, the defendants, mem-
bers of a labor union, went to a bracero work camp to induce its
residents to join the labor union. A riot ensued during which several
of the defendants chased a number of the braceros out of their
houses at knife point, beating up some and ordering others out of
the camp. At the trial level, the defendants were convicted of
kidnapping; however, the California Supreme Court held that the
requisite asportation necessary for conviction was lacking.
The prosecution relies principally on People v. Rich. In that case,
the victims, under threat of a knife attack, were forced to accom-
pany defendant for 10 or 12 blocks in an automobile while he at-
tempted to escape following the burglary of a market. Certain broad
language used in that case should be confined to the facts therein
which manifestly demonstrate a commission of the offense denounced
by section 207 of the Penal Code, and such language cannot reason-
ably be held applicable to the factual background and evidentiary
features of the case with which we are here concerned.31
28 177 Cal. App. 2d 617, 2 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1960).
29 Id. at 621, 2 Cal. Rptr. at 602 (citations omitted).
30 56 Cal. 2d 459, 364 P.2d 241, 15 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1961).
31 Id. at 464, 364 P.2d at 244, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
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The court went on to give a standard by which asportation can be
established in a given set of facts:
That section [207] would have no application at all, but fdr a 1905
amendment adding ". . . into another part of the same county."
This amendment was added in view of Ex parte Keil, where it was
held that the forcible removal of a person from San Pedro to Santa
Catalina Island, both in Los Angeles County, could not constitute
kidnapping under the statute as it existed at that time. A review of
those cases in which the statute was applied since 1905 reveals that
each asportation was for the accomplishment of an illegal purpose,
such as in the Rich case.... In the instant case, the only movements
that occurred were those natural in a riot or assault. The evidence
reveals that persons were pushed to the ground, dragged around,
chased, and assaulted. All "asportation" in the instant case would
appear to be only incidental to the assault and rioting.32
In addition, the court stated that to apply section 207 to the type of
fact situation involved in the Cotton case would lead to an unrea-
sonable result:
Such a holding could result in a rule that every assault could also
be prosecuted for kidnapping under Penal Code section 207, as long
as the slightest movement was involved. Where the movement is
incidental to the alleged assault, Penal Code section 207 should not
have application, as the Legislature could not reasonably have in-
tended that such incidental movement be a taking "... from one
part of the county to another." 33
The court then quoted People v. Oliver for the statement:
All laws should receive a sensible construction. General terms
should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice
or oppression or an absurd consequence. It will always be presumed
that the legislature intended exceptions to its language which
would avoid results of this character. 34
Turning to the Chessman case we find what is possibly the source
of the more recent difficulties with the asportation element of
kidnapping. Not only have the statements made in Chessman as to
what constitutes asportation been used to define that element in a
statute not involved in the case, but the case also reached an illogical
result under its own statute.
In Chessman the defendant was convicted of violating section
209. The fact situation involved is quite pertinent to the problem.
32 Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
33 Id. at 465, 364 P.2d at 244, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
34 55 Cal. 2d 761, 767, 361 P.2d 593, 12 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1961), quohing from
Ex parte Lorenzen, 128 Cal. 431, 439-40, 61 P. 68, 71 (1900).
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On one occasion the defendant stopped his car near a parked car
occupied by Lee and Regina. He displayed a 45-calibre automatic
pistol, and during the ensuing events repeatedly threatened his
victims in order to intimidate them to obey his commands. The
defendant took the man's wallet, the keys to the car and the woman's
purse. He then forced the woman to walk 22 feet to his car; after
entering the car he sexually assaulted her. When another automobile
approached, the defendant took $5.00 from Regina's purse, returned
the purse and keys to her, and allowed her to leave his car. On the
second occasion, the defendant approached a parked car occupied
by Hurlburt and Mary, and, pushing a 45-calibre automatic pistol
through the window, said, 'this is a stick-up." Both victims replied
they did not have any money, whereupon the defendant forced Mary
to enter his car, drove to an isolated place and compelled her to
submit to sexual acts.
The fact that Regina in being kidnaped or carried away was forced
to move only 22 feet does not make her abduction any the less kid-
naping within the meaning of the statute. She was taken from the
car of her chosen escort, and from his company, to the car of de-
fendant and into the latter's company and there detained as a virtual
prisoner and forced to submit to his demands. It is the fact, not the
distance, of forcible removal which constitutes kidnaping in this
state.35
The illogical result in the Chessman case becomes obvious when
the 1951 amendment to section 209 is considered. Due to the
cases resulting in convictions for violation of 209 when the asporta-
tion involved was merely the detention of the person while he was
being robbed, the legislature removed the words "hold" or "detain"
from the statute. This was a reasonable change because the wording
of the statute had resulted in the very crime of robbery also being a
35 People v. Chessman, 38 Cal. 2d 166, 192, 238 P.2d 1001, 1017 (1951). See
People v. Oganesoff, 81 Cal. App. 2d 709, 711, 184 P.2d 953, 954 (1947) (forcibly
carrying victim from automobile into house upheld as kidnapping) ; People v. Shields,
70 Cal. App. 2d 628, 630, 161 P.2d 475, 479 (1945) (carrying child from front of
house to roof supported conviction of kidnapping); People v. Melendrez, 25 Cal. 2d
490, 494, 77 P.2d 870, 872 (1938) (forcing victim to walk 50 to 75 feet held "an
act of kidnapping"); People v. Cook, 18 Cal. App. 2d 625, 627, 64 P.2d 449, 450
(1937) (shoving victim into house from sidewalk constituted kidnapping); People
v. Raucho, 8 Cal. App. 2d 655, 665, 47 P.2d 1108, 1112 (1935) (forcing victims to
cross street and enter automobile constituted "kidnaping and carrying away"); State
v. Taylor, 70 N.D. 201, 209, 293 N.W. 219, 224 (1940) (defendant compelled
victim to drive for a very short distance, held "where asportation is charged, the
distance removed is not material"); Cox v. State, 203 Ind. 544, 550, 177 N.E. 898, 900,
affid, 181 N.E. 469, 472 (1932) (forcible carrying of child 90 feet was held to be within
the kidnapping statute).
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kidnapping-for-robbery. As pointed out earlier, the first case after
the amendment was Chessman, in which the court stated that aspor-
tation was established by the fact that a victim was actually moved,
regardless of the amount of the movement, and held 22 feet to
be a sufficient distance to constitute asportation. If the statements in
Chessman are carried to a more or less typical robbery situation, it
is discernible that this was not the legislature's intent. -ypotheti-
cally, A enters a liquor store and orders the clerk, who is stocking
shelves, to go to the cash register and hand over the money. The
clerk moves ten feet to the cash register and turns over the money
to A. Applying Chessman, A may have violated section 209. It is
doubtful that the legislature intended that this standard robbery
situation should lead to a prosecution for kidnapping, or that the
prosecutor should have an unlimited option to charge either robbery
or kidnapping-for-robbery, or both, or mere false imprisonment. As
noted by Justice Carter in People v. Wein,8 6 "as a result of the
Chessman and the instant decision while robbery is not per se a
violation of section 209, if the robber moves his victim one inch he
is subject to the death penalty" and this observation, vigorously
made, must be said to accurately reflect the law of California today.
B. Specific Intent
The principal case defining the specific intent required by section
209 is People v. Brown,37 wherein the defendant entered his female
victim's car and forced her to drive to a remote area where he then
sexually assaulted her. Upon completion of this act, the defendant
questioned her as to how much money she had, and when she
replied that she only had $1.50, he struck her on the chin. The
defendant took her watch and purse containing the $1.50 and fled
in her car. The defense claimed that there had been no violation of
section 209 for the defendant robbed his victim only as an after-
thought; his principal and primary intent was to commit rape. The
court in ruling against this argument stated:
This section makes it unnecessary to determine whether the kid-
naper intended to commit extortion or robbery at the time of the
original seizure or carrying away. It is sufficient if the extortion or
robbery was committed during the course of the abduction. Thus,
whatever may have been the original motive of the kidnaping, he
36 50 Cal. 2d 383, 326 P.2d 457 (1958).
37 29 Cal. 2d 555, 176 P.2c1 929 (1947).
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"holds or detains" his victim "to commit extortion or robbery"
within the meaning of section 209.38
There is apparently some confusion in the courts as to whether
the above statement in the Brown case is still the law in California.
In People v. Smith,39 the court points out that both the Brown
and the Knowles cases were decided before the 1951 amendment to
section 209, when "detention" alone was suffident to establish
kidnapping-for-robbery, and there was no requirement of asporta-
tion. The court states that the amendment changed the "intent"
element of the statute:
Accordingly, an additional effect of the change in the statute is to
make it necessary for the trier of fact to determine whether the
kidnaper intended to commit robbery at the time of the original
seizing. In this respect the crime is similar to burglary where it is
necessary to show that the entry was with intent to commit larceny
or any felony. An illegal entry but without such an intent is not a
burglary... [S]imilarly since the 1951 amendment to section 209,
kidnapping without intent to rob constitutes kidnapping but not kid-
napping for purpose of robbery; and a robbery during a kidnapping
where the intent was formed after the asportation is a robbery and
not a kidnapping for purpose of robbery.40
The 1964 case of People v. Lindsay,41 follows the Smith case. The
factual situation in Lindsay is typical of many of the cases which
have resulted in convictions for violation of section 209. The defen-
dant had raped his victim and then robbed her. He claimed that his
whole effort was devoted to satisfying his sexual desires, and that
any robbery which occurred was merely an afterthought. The in-
struction given by the trial court was essentially the same as the
language of the Brown case in saying that it was unnecessary to
determine whether the kidnapper intended to commit robbery at
the time of the original seizure and carrying away. The Lindsay
court, in following the Smith case, ruled that the instruction was
error:
We agree with the interpretation placed by Smith upon section
209. We are satisfied that when the Legislature, in 1951, inserted
38 Id. at 558, 176 P.2d at 931. This statement has Been followed in People v.
Knowles, 35 Cal. 2d 175, 185, 217 P.2d 1 (1950); People v. Hernandez, 100 Cal.
App. 2d 128, 133, 223 P.2d 71 (1950); People v. Bean, 88 Cal. App. 2d 34, 37,
198 P.2d 379 (1948).
39 223 Cal. App. 2d 225, 233-34, 35 Cal. Rptr. 719, 723-24. Petition for hearing
by the California Supreme Court was denied on February 5, 1964.
40 Id. at 234, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
41 227 Cal. App. 2d 482, 38 Cal. Rptr. 755 (1964).
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the words "or any person who kidnaps or carries away any individual
to commit robbery" . . . in said section, it was the legislative intent
that robbery be premeditated as part of the kidnapping. The phrase
"to commit robbery" obviously means with the intent or purpose of
committing a robbery.42
In 1966, the California Supreme Court, in deciding In re Ward,
4
1
reaffirmed the Brown rule by stating that "where a robbery is com-
mitted during the course of a kidnaping the crime becomes kid-
naping for the purpose of robbery from the beginning, regardless
of the kidnaper's intention. ' 44 The court made no mention of the
Smith and Lindsay decisions in upholding the language of the
Brown case. One explanation for the apparent contradiction in the
above cases may center around the fact that in the Ward case the
defendant was appealing by way of habeas corpus from a conviction
handed down 20 years earlier, at which time the law may have been
that as stated in the Brown case.
Thus it would seem at this juncture that a substantial question
remains concerning the point in time at which the specific intent to
rob must be formed. 5 What the California Supreme Court will do
at this point is problematical, although the rationale of the Smith
and Lindsay cases seems to be more consistent, in the author's view,
with the basic framework of the legislation.
It seems certain that in any modification of the law, and even
without any modification, only the dominant intent of the kidnapper
should be considered. In its present form the statute refers to kid-
napping "for the purpose of robbery;" however, the defense that the
42 Id. at 509, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 772-73.
43 64 Cal. 2d 672, 414 P.2d 400, 51 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1966).
44 Id. at 677, 414 P.2d at 404, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 276.
45 A collateral problem concerning the area of intent is developed in the case of
People v. Oliver, 55 Cal. 2d 761, 765, 361 P.2d 593, 597, 12 Cal. Rptr. 865, 867
(1961). Here the supreme court set forth what it considered to be the absurd result
of a strict interpretation of the intent element of kidnapping.
If I find a young child alone on the highway and take him into my automobile,
whether he resist or goes with me passively, intending to transport him to a
police station or to his home; if I find such a child at the edge of a body of
water in which he might drown or at the edge of a precipice over which
he might fall and seize him even brusquely, whatever his resistance, and
forcibly carry him to a place of greater safety; if I find such a child on the
sidewalk and take his hand and walk along with him out of friendliness or
a fondness for children or any other innocent or innocuous reason with no
malign or evil purpose, nobody could reasonably believe that it was the inten-
tion of the Legislature that for any of these acts I could be convicted of the
crime of kidnaping.
Based upon this reasoning the court held that an illegal purpose or intent was
necessary and must accompany the overall act involved.
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actor kidnapped his victim for another purpose, i.e., rape, and only
incidently robbed her, has not been recognized. By not recognizing
such a defense the California courts are in effect allowing a defen-
dant to be charged with a capital offense when the principal crime he
committed was a lesser one such as rape.
C. Bodily Harm
Perhaps the most crucial issue which confronts the defendant
charged with violating section 209 is whether his victim has suffered
bodily harm. If the victim has remained unscathed, the defendant
will face life imprisonment, but with the possibility of parole. On
the other hand, if it is resolved at the trial that the victim has
suffered bodily harm the defendant may be subjected to the more
extreme penalties of death, or imprisonment without parole. Thus,
a critical issue invariably arises: has the victim met with harm of
such magnitude to be categorized as "bodily harm"?
Unfortunately, there is no statutory definition of bodily harm. Not
uncommonly, the indefiniteness of a key phrase has called forth a
wide variety of judicial pronouncements and refinements. Recently,
the California courts have retreated to a certain extent from some
of the earlier, excessively broad definitions given to bodily harm.
However, a number of considerable problems remain, and the need
for a statutory definition may be dearly illustrated by a review of
the case law in the area.
Until 1955 the principal case concerning "bodily harm" was
People v. Tanner,46 in which the court chose to define it as:
"any touching of the person of another against his will with physical
force in an intentional, hostile and aggravated manner, or pro-
jecting of such force against his person." 8 C.J. 1134; People v.
Moore, 50 Hun (N.Y.) 356, 3 N.Y. Supp. 159; 1 Words and
Phrases, First Series, page 817; King v. Hostetter, 7 Canadian Crim-
inal Law, 221.47
This latitudinal statement far exceeded what was necessary for the
disposition of the issue.
In Tanner, the defendant and an accomplice lay in wait for the
victim, Henry G. Bodkin, a prominent attorney, outside his house,
and seized him as he approached the garage. After forcing the victim
40 3 Cal. 2d 279, 44 P.2d 324 (1934).
47 Id. at 297, 44 P.2d at 332.
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to return to the house and locking his young son and maid inside
a closet, the defendants attempted to convince Mr. and Mrs. Bodkin
to tell them where certain large sums of money were concealed. In
order to overcome his victims' reluctance to speak, defendant Tanner
formed a torch from a heavy magazine cover and proceeded to
apply the flame to Mr. Bodkin's bound hands. While this did cause
the victim to cry out in pain, he did not devulge the whereabouts of
any money. Finally, when the torch had been consumed, the
defendants decided that they must have been given a "bum steer,"
so after taking the maid and boy from the closet and tying them up,
the defendants fled.48 At the trial level, Tanner and his accomplice,
Brooks, were found guilty of the kidnapping-for-robbery charge and
were sentenced to death.
In its opinion, the California Supreme Court first observed that
the phrases "actual bodily harm," ".great bodily harm," or "bodily
harm," had not been used by the drafters of the statute. Thus, the
court reasoned that since the legislature did not utilize one of those
phrases, the term "bodily harm" must denote something less. The
court then sought the individual meanings of "bodily" and "harm"
and ascertained that bodily was synonymous with physical, and
harm with "'hurt; injury; damage; (2) grief, pain, sorrow; (3)
evil; wrong; wickedness.' (Webster's International Dictionary, 2d
ed.) ."9 The court concluded that:
There can be no doubt that applying fire to the hands of a person
in the manner described by the witnesses in the instant case to the
degree that it causes such person to suffer acute pain, is to do bodily
harm. To bind persons in the manner in which the Bodkins were
bound is to do them bodily harm. Mrs. Bodkin, while not subjected
to the ordeal of fire, was imprisoned in a dose and overheated closet,
three by five feet in dimension, with two other persons for quite a
period, and was finally left bound with the other members of the
household. These acts unquestionably amount to bodily harm.50
Thus, in a loosely worded opinion the Tanner court determined that
tying a victim's hands constituted "bodily harm," and was thereby
the determining factor between the more severe penalties of death
or life imprisonment without parole, and the lesser one of life
imprisonment.
Three years later in People v. Britton,51 where the victim was
48 Id. at 286-87, 44 P.2d at 327.
49 Id. at 297, 44 P.2d at 332.
5o Id. (emphasis added).
51 6 Cal. 2d 1, 56 P.2d 494 (1936).
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robbed, blindfolded, bound, and struck over the head, the court
quoting from Tanner, reaffirmed its previous definition of bodily
harm by stating that the "appellants' criminal acts constituted 'bodily
harm' within the meaning of section 209 .... ",52 While it may be
accurate to hold that striking a person on the head and binding
him with copper wire constitute "bodily harm" when that phrase is
used in the abstract, this amount of harm approaches insignificance
when used as the fulcrum for a decision in which the defendant's
life hangs in the balance. The fact of bodily harm disqualifies the
defendant from any hope of parole, and at the very least commits
him to prison for the rest of his natural life.
Several years later, the California Supreme Court experienced
little difficulty in concluding that rape would also qualify as "bodily
harm." In People v. Brown,53 the defendant had forced his victim
to drive her car to a secluded area and walk up a hill where he then
raped and robbed her. Prior to raping the victim, the defendant
struck her on the chin (which remained bruised and discolored for
several days), knocking her to the ground. Under the Tanner
definition, a blow to the chin would be adequate for a finding of
the requisite "bodily harm." Nevertheless, the court went on to
say by way of dicta that the forcible rape itself was to be considered
bodily harm. Moreover, the court specifically disapproved a Second
District Court of Appeals opinion in an earlier case, implying that
rape should not be considered bodily injury."' There the defendant
had challenged the sentence he had received for the crimes of rape,
and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury,
as being double punishment, arguing that the latter crime was
included within the rape conviction. In discounting that argument
the appellate court had stated:
If it be suggested that the act of sexual intercourse is itself one
likely to produce great bodily injury there are several obvious reasons
why that argument is beside the point. First and foremost is the fact
that the act of intercourse is not the force by which resistance is
overcome. Again, in rape, the penetration need be only infinitesimal
and may cause not the slightest injury. It is no more reasonable to
say that the act of sexual intercourse committed by force constitutes
an assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury
than to say it is an assault with a deadly weapon. 55
52 Id. at 3-4, 56 P.2d at 495.
0 29 Cal. 2d 555, 176 P.2d 929 (1947).
54 Id. at 560, 176 P.2c1 at 931.
5 People v. McIlvain, 55 Cal. App. 2d 322, 332, 130 P.2d 131, 136 (1942).
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While rape is certainly more injurious than bound hands, it does
not automatically follow that the interests of society uniformly
demand more extreme penalties as a consequence. Rape itself carries
a substantial penalty. If this is inadequate, the rape statute should be
changed rather than have the judiciary extend the applicability of
section 209.
In 1951 the supreme court added the violation of California Penal
Code Section 288a0 6 to the scope of "bodily harm," and also re-
affirmed its decision in Brown, when it decided the case of People v.
Chessman." Here the trial court had instructed the jury utilizing the
Tanner definition of bodily harm, and further instructed that both
attempted forcible rape, and a compelled violation of section 288a,
were "bodily harm." Chessman argued that the trial court's instruc-
tions were erroneous, but the supreme court affirmed saying:
In the Brown case we .. .declared that "The forcible rape itself
was bodily harm." We note that the facts of the Brown case differ
from those of defendant's case in that Brown actually struck his
victim as well as raping her, but we hold that the rule of the
Brown case is equally applicable here. It would belie sensibility and
defame the mores of our age to hold that such treatment as the
female victims received here is not the infliction of "bodily harm"
within the meaning of section 209 of the Penal Code.58
Until 1955 the California Supreme Court had been content to
minimize the quantity of harm necessary to constitute "bodily harm."
However, in People v. Jackson,50 the court reexamined the Tanner
definition. In a thorough opinion the court ostensibly determined
that "bodily harm" meant "serious bodily injury." In Jackson, it
appeared that the only injuries suffered by the victim were superficial
marks-similar to those made by an expansion wrist-watch band-
which were the result of his wrists being bound tightly by chains.
The opinion states that "[w]hen released, [the victim] stated that
he felt 'wonderful.' No physical examination was given him at that
time and there appeared to be no necessity for one."' 0
In Jackson, the trial court held that there was sufficient evidence
to sentence one of the defendants to death and the other to life
imprisonment without possibility of parole. However, the supreme
56 CAL. PEN. CODE § 288a (West 1955).
57 38 Cal. 2d 166, 238 P.2d 1001 (1951).
58 Id. at 185, 238 P.2d at 1013.
59 44 Cal. 2d 511, 282 P.2d 898 (1955).
60 Id. at 516-17, 282 P.2d at 901.
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court was reluctant to affirm, since the injury here, while technically
"bodily harm," was obviously slight or no injury at all.
The Jackson court noted that section 209 had been patterned after
the Federal Lindbergh Law which, though also imposing the maxi-
mum penalty if the victim is not released unmolested, uses the term
"unharmed" rather than "without bodily injury." Reference was
then made to Robinson v. United States,6' which had interpreted
"unharmed" as "uninjured." The Jackson court drew extensively
from the United States Supreme Court's analysis of the rationale
behind such a provision:
Two possible reasons suggest themselves . . . as to the motivation
of Congress in making the severity of a kidnapper's punishment
depend upon whether his victim has been injured. The first reason
is the old belief that the severity of the injury should measure the
rigor of the punishment. If this be the reasoning implicit in the
statute, it would appear that Congress intended that for a kidnapper
to obtain the benefit of the proviso he must both liberate and refrain
from injuring his victim. Congress may equally have intended this
provision as a deterrent, on the theory that kidnappers would be less
likely to inflict violence upon their victims if they knew that such
abstention would save them from the death penalty. This assumption
finds some slight support in the legislative history, is not contested
by the government, [and] has been accepted in one case [United
States v. Parker, 19 F. Supp. 450, 103 F.2d 857] ....
... The quality of the injury to which Congress referred is not
defined. It may be possible that some types of injury would be of
such trifling nature as to be excluded from the category of injuries
which Congress had in mind.62
The California Supreme Court conceded that there had been
similar uncertainties with the California statute, and, citing the
Tanner case, determined that the state courts had chosen to adopt
the traditional meaning given the words "bodily harm" in the con-
text of an action in tort for a battery. While recognizing the lip
service given to the Tanner definition in Britton, Brown and Chess-
man, this court now reasoned that in all those cases there had been
"serious bodily harm," rather than mere "bodily harm." Justice
Edmonds, writing for the court, expressed doubt as to the applicability
of the Tanner definition:
If the more serious penalty may be imposed when the only injury
is of a nature similar to that shown by the present record, which con-
61 324 U.S. 282 (1945).
02 Id. at 283-85 (footnotes omitted).
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cededly is almost necessarily an incident to every forcible kidnaping,
neither the purpose of enhancement of the penalty for the more
heinous crime nor the intention of deterring the kidnaper from
killing or injuring his victim is subserved. On the contrary, if there
necessarily be bodily injury in almost every kidnaping sufficent to
warrant imposition of the more serious penalty, the kidnaper might
well reason that the better course for him would be to kill the victim
to minimize the probability of identification. 3
Justice Edmonds believed that the legislature could not possibly
have contemplated applying the aggravated kidnapping statute to
a case of the nature of that before the court. In this decision, the
California Supreme Court finally drew a line as to the quantum
of injury, below which it would refuse to find bodily harm. Since
the Jackson case there have been three cases in which the facts
reported are sufficient to ascertain the current post-Jackson meaning
of "serious bodily harm."
In People v. Langdon,64 the court affirmed the defendant's death
sentence under section 209. The defendant had robbed a Western
Union office and forced a clerk into a back room where he attempted
to sexually assault her. Meeting resistance with several blows of
a pipe wrench; the defendant, while not accomplishing rape, beat
the victim to the extent that she required medical treatment for
three deep lacerations on her head. This evidently constituted
'serious bodily harm," although the court did not specifically discuss
this point.
Subsequently, in the 1961 case of People v. Monk,05 the court
affirmed the death penalty on two counts of section 209. One victim
had been raped, subjected to a violation of Penal Code section 288a,
and her nose and jaw had been broken in the course of a severe
beating. The other victim had received a number of cuts and bruises.
The court summarily concluded that both victims had been subjected
to bodily harm.6" Granted, the first victim did suffer the degree of
harm characterized as serious bodily harm by the Jackson court;
nevertheless, a similar conclusion as to the second victim is highly
questionable. Can there be any real justification for a holding that
minor cuts and bruises are in most instances serious bodily harm?
Of even more significance is the issue of causation presented by
63 44 Cal. 2d at 517, 282 P.2d at 901.
64 52 Cal. 2d 425, 341 P.2d 303 (1959).
65 56 Cal. 2d 288, 363 P.2d 865, 14 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1961).
66 Id. at 296, 363 P.2d at 868, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
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the case. It should be noted that the defendant never physically
touched the second victim. After she had been forced into the
defendant's car, and had thrown her wallet containing $16.00 into
the back seat pursuant to the defendant's directions, the victim was
threatened with rape. Considering such a prospect undesirable, she
leaped from the moving vehicle as it slowed for a red light. The
court held that even though this woman was not touched, her fear,
occasioned by Monk's threats, caused the leap which produced the
injury and therefore Monk had been responsible for the victim's
bodily harm. In the court's words:
While no cases have been found involving kidnaping for the
purpose of robbery where the bodily harm was not directly inflicted
by the accused upon his victim, we are persuaded that the doctrine
of proximate causation is applicable in a case such as the present one
where the defendant's threats of bodily harm caused his victim to
receive injuries in an attempt to escape therefrom.67
However, in People v. Baker,68 the Second District Court of Ap-
peals reached a different result on similar facts. There the victim,
driving a truck loaded with whiskey, was held up and then confined
in the rear of the truck. After a lengthy period of time, the victim
managed to open the rear door of the moving vehicle. An accomplice
of the defendant, riding in a following vehicle, warned the defen-
dant who then slowed the truck. At this juncture, the victim jumped
from the vehicle, injuring himself in the process.
The defendant argued, and the court agreed, that such injuries
were not within the contemplation of the framers of section 209.
Relying on the Monk decision, the prosecution maintained that the
injuries received were proximately caused by the defendant's threats
of harm. In reaching its conclusion, the court held that Monk
should be construed in light of Jackson, which had differentiated
between those injuries that are inherent in a forcible kidnaping
and those injuries not inherent in the crime itself, but which are
gratuitiously added by the kidnaper to abuse and terrorize his victim.
... [T]here would be no deterrent to killing the victim of a kid-
naping if there were no distinction between injuries inherent in a
crime and gratuitous physical abuse which are in no respect inherent
in the crime but are separate and apart from it.69
67 Id.
68 231 Cal. App. 2d 301, 41 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1964).
69 Id. at 303-05, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 697-98.
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Counterbalancing this, the Baker court pointed out that any victim
of a crime may attempt to resist or escape, and if the defendant
thwarts this attempt by killing the victim, or if the victim suffers
injuries which cause his death, the defendant may be prosecuted
for murder. Likewise, if the victim suffers bodily harm not amount-
ing to death, the defendant may be charged with some form of
assault and battery. However, in Baker the defendant was charged
only with robbery (Penal Code Section 211) and kidnapping-for-
robbery, and was not charged with assault or battery. Recognizing
that the victim had been injured as a direct result of the robbery-
kidnapping, the Baker court explained that:
If they [defendant's injuries] had been inflicted directly or proxi-
mately caused by appellant by threats or bodily harm as in Monk,
• . . instead of self-inflicted as a result of the victim's attempt to
escape, such injuries could be considered a gratuitous aggravation
of a completed crime.... [I]he evidence in the case at bench is
completely lacking even remotely of any act by the kidnaper of
bodily harm to the victim or any gratuitous threat of bodily harm
made by the kidnaper to the victim before he jumped from the
truck, thus aggravating an already completed crime. The bodily
harm suffered by the victim in the case at bench was not the result
of any intentional gratuitous aggravation of the completed crime by
the kidnaper, nor was it suffered as a consequence of an actual
threat of gratuitous aggravation of the completed crime.
.. . In respect of the charged crime of kidnaping, we do not
believe that "bodily harm" within the meaning of section 209 of
the Penal Code is intended to include as an aggravation of the
specific crime of kidnaping self-inflicted injuries suffered by a
victim as a consequence of an escape or an attempt to escape.70
The court here validly distinguished between the situation where
the victim reacts to the defendant's threats, as in Monk, and the
situation in which he is injured as a result of his choice to risk an
escape. The former facts will allow section 209 to be applied, while
the latter facts call for no more than an additional count of battery
in conjunction with a section 207 prosecution. Therefore, it may be
premature to suggest that Baker has imposed any firm judicial limita-
tion on causation within the concept of bodily harm. There is, how-
ever, little doubt that the decision reflects a significant trend to take
a more cautious approach to the broad, and sometimes harsh, literal
interpretation of the bodily harm element of section 209 which has
prevailed over the years.
70 Id. at 306, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 699 (emphasis added).
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Another case in line with this trend is People v. Gilbert,7 which
reached the California Supreme Court in December of 1965. The
court was confronted with a unique and unusual aspect of the tradi-
tional defense argument on bodily harm. In the course of a bank
robbery perpetrated by Gilbert and an accomplice, a woman teller
had been used as a momentary shield or cover. At trial the teller
described the defendant's grip on her arm as "firm," and explained
that she had " 'felt the impressions on that arm for sometime,' "
yet she was unsure whether she had fallen to the sidewalk or been
thrust there during the defendant's escape.m Gilbert had also
killed a policeman during the escape. At the trial in which his client
was charged with first degree murder, as well as kidnapping-for-
robbery, Gilbert's attorney contended that the jury should be in-
structed as to the bodily harm provision of section 209. The judge
refused the proffered instruction, finding that the kidnapping
victim, the woman teller, had received no serious bodily harm. The
jury sentenced Gilbert to death for the murder of the policeman. On
appeal, the defense attorney argued that the trial court's failure to
give the instruction prevented the jury from recommending life im-
prisonment without possibility of parole as an alternative to death
or simple life imprisonment. The California Supreme Court upheld
the trial court's findings and went on to elaborate:
Gilbert contends, however, that "any touching of the person of
another against his will with physical force in an intentional, hostile
and aggravated manner, or the projecting of such force against
his person" constitutes bodily harm within the meaning of section
209. We rejected this definition in the Jackson case, however, and
pointed out that in the Tanner case and the cases following it the
kidnaping victim suffered serious bodily injury.
73
In summary, while "bodily harm" is by no means clearly defined,
it has now been construed to mean at least "serious bodily harm."
However, within "serious bodily harm" is included:
[F]orcible rape [Brown]; sex perversion [Chessman]; burning the
victim's hands to such a degree as to cause acute pain [Tanner];
blindfolding the victim, striking him over the head, and binding him
with copper wire [Britton]; hitting the victim on the head with
the barrel of a pistol [Knowles]; binding the victim's hands and feet
with ropes and wire [Tannei; and imprisoning the victim in a dose
71 63 Cal. 2d 690, 408 P.2d 365, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965).
72 Id. at 711, 408 P.2d 377, 47 Cal. Rptr. 921.
73 Id (citations omitted).
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and overheated closet with 2 other persons for almost an hour
[Tanner].74
While this enumeration may seem too inclusive, it is nonetheless a
valid one. It must be recognized that the Jaekson court rejected the
definition used in the prior decisions, while approving the findings
that "bodily harm" or "serious bodily harm" had occurred.
D. Penalty
More than a century ago, Thomas Jefferson said that he would
favor the death penalty when the infallibility of man had been
demonstrated to him. Although the imposition of the death penalty
has traditionally been a matter of concern to every United States citi-
zen, it may be of particular interest to the legal profession when con-
sidered in the context of section 209. Since the penalties prescribed
in that section exceed the sentences imposed for premeditated
murder-death or life imprisonment with the possibility of pa-
role75-- a valid question may therefore be raised as to whether or
not such punishment is disproportionate to the crime involved.
Under existing law, as it pertains to the kidnapping-for-robbery
section, Justice Carter makes a strong argument that the penalty
itself constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and is therefore
violative of the constitutional mandate. Certainly, as a matter of
legislative history, no enactment has been passed in California
which indicates that the punishment for either rape or robbery is
death. Yet when a rape occurs, accompanied by an incidental rob-
bery, the death penalty has been invoked. It would seem that the
chance movement of the victim during the course of the robbery
would not justify the imposition of such a severe sentence. In the
Wlein 76 case, the movement of five different victims from 4 to 75
feet invoked a demand for the death penalty from the district at-
torney, not because the defendant had moved his victim, but for the
sexual assaults he made upon them. As Justice Carter indicated, the
district attorney, in order to buttress his argument,77 relied upon the
military law which decrees death for rape. Obviously, if rape is in
fact a crime to be so severely punished, appropriate legislation could
be enacted; but to permit such grievous consequences to flow from
74 29 CAL. JuR. 2d Kidnapping § 15 at 672 (citations omitted).
'75 CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 190-190.1 (West 1955).
76 People v. Wein, 50 Cal. 2d 383, 326 P.2d 457 (1958).
77 Id. at 424, 326 P.2d at 481.
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the incidental movement alone makes a mockery of our penal
sanctions. If such penalty, viewed in the context of section 209, is
thought to be a deterrent, so also may torture be viewed as a deter-
rent. Even aside from the moral implications, however, torture is so
disproportionate in its consequences to the harm we seek to prevent,
that it is not utilized.
If the punishment is being imposed for rape, it would seem inap-
propriate to impose death in a case where robbery occurs, and be
unable to similarly treat a like case wherein nothing whatsoever is
taken from the victim. It has been pointed out by some that kidnap-
ping for ransom inherently presents a combination of factors creating
a substantial risk of bodily harm. In the ransom situation, "forcible
control is necessary to effect secret confinement; the offense requires
a protracted concealment; the confinement becomes more difficult to
maintain when the kidnapper's flight ultimately becomes necessary;
and the victim's release grows increasingly dangerous with the
passage of time."78 Accordingly, a demand for ransom generally
involves an express or an implied threat of death or great bodily
harm. On the other hand, kidnapping-for-robbery does not present
these risk-aggravating circumstances inherent in an attempt to
obtain ransom. Forcible control is not always necessary; the victim
need not even be seized; and if he is, he may immediately affect his
release through compliance with the unlawful demand.
In the author's view, the punishments in California under the
indeterminate sentence procedures insure by and large sufficient con-
finement to protect not only the interests of society but also to effect
the desired rehabilitation of the individual. To impose the supreme
penalty when a life has not been taken, and to deny the actor any
possibility in his natural life of affecting proof of his rehabilitation,
not only brutalizes the society that demands it, but also demeans
the very purposes and philosophy of the Adult Authority 9 which
regulates and supervises the concept of the indeterminate sentence.
It appears that over the years section 209 is the only penal enact-
ment completely depriving the Adult Authority, which is charged
with the responsibility of executing the purposes of our penal
sanctions, from discharging any obligation or exercising any control
whatsoever over those convicted. To take from this authority the
78 Comment, Room-to-Room Movement: A Risk Rationale for Aggravated Kid-
naping, 11 STAN. L. REv. 554, 555 (1959).
79 CAL. PEIN. CODE §§ 5075-5081 (West 1955).
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powers entrusted to it by the State of California in one particular
type of case, as different from all others, would seem to be an arbi-
trary distinction finding no precedence or rational basis. It is not
the author's intention to debate the merits of capital punishment.
That discussion has been presented in comprehensive detail in other
forums.8 0 However, a memorable position taken by Clarence Darrow
in the "Loeb-Leopold" case may be of some interest in this context.
In response to the argument advanced by the prosecutor that the
defendants should receive the same treatment as the victim, Darrow
commented:
Give them the same mercy as Bobby Franks [the victim]. Is that the
law? Is that justice? Is that what this court should do? Is that what
a state's attorney should do? If the state in which I live is not kinder,
more humane, more considerate, more intelligent than the mad acts
of these two boys, I am sorry that I have lived so long.81
It is the view of the author that the mere presence of this penalty
within the enactment has created abuses in the criminal process and
has given powers to prosecutors not contemplated by either the legis-
lature, the courts, or the people. The mere declaration of a prosecu-
tor at the onset of a jury trial, that this case may be an appropriate
one for the infliction of the death penalty, is sufficient under exist-
ing law to activate the problem of death-qualified juries. By that
simple pronouncement a substantial number of otherwise qualified
jurors are eliminated from serving on the case. Although they do
serve on other extremely serious and significant criminal cases,
those jurors would be disqualified for cause due to their strong
dislike of capital punishment. Their opinions can be revealed in the
street but not in the jury room. Their opponents, however, can
express their views in both places. Significantly, it has been variously
estimated that from 25 to 75 out of every 100 Americans are thus
eliminated from serving in an area involving the gravest responsi-
bility in our criminal law. It is questionable whether such an existing
jury composition accurately reflects the cross-section of our national
and community life.
80 See Jewel, The Death Penalty, 36 CALIF. S.B.J. 228 (1961); ACLU Attacks
Capital Punishment, The Christian Century, Sept. 22, 1965, at 32; Capital Punishment,
The New Republic, June 8, 1963, at 5; Is The Death Sentence Dying?, Newsweek,
Feb. 11, 1963, at 31; McBee, Edging Away From Capital Punishment, The New Re-
.public, Jan. 30, 1965, at 11; Oliver, The Death Penalty and Pair Trial, The Nation,
April 6, 1964, at 342; On The Way Out, The Nation, Nov. 23, 1964, at 367; Star,
The Biter Battle Over Capital Punishment, Look, May 7, 1963, at 23.
81 WEINBERG, A'rORNEY FOR THE DAMNED 38 (1957).
[Vol. 4
KIDNAPPING STATUTE
At the option of a prosecutor, a defendant who has moved his
victim during a robbery may be encouraged or even coerced to enter
a plea of guilty to a robbery charge with a view to avoiding the more
serious consequences of a conviction under 209. The possibility that
a jury may consider factors such as those in People v. Morsel" (i.e.,
that a person sentenced to life might be released before he may safely
be returned to society, because of a weakness in the parole system) is
an additional disadvantage. A jury may be encouraged to compen-
sate for possible future release by imposing a harsher penalty than
the evidence warrants.
Under the present interpretation of section 209, it would seem, as
Justice Carter feared, that at the whim or caprice of a prosecutor
simple robbery may become, if incidental movement of the victim is
present, a kidnapping from which most assuredly flow consequences
never contemplated by the legislature. It is suggested that to lessen
such sanctions would in no way impede or prevent the imposition of
the substantial penalties that flow from related substantive offenses.
IV. REVISED AND PROPOSED STATUTES
While it may be adequate to point out the defects of an existing
statute, certainly a more constructive course of action would be to
propose a statute which would eliminate the problems previously
discussed and which, hopefully, would not be open to attack on the
grounds that it creates more problems than it solves. This is the task
which is undertaken in this section.
First, it would seem appropriate to delete from the present statute
certain language which has become superfluous. Some of these dele-
tions do not change the import of the statute since the obsolete
language adds nothing to the meaning, but rather tends to cloud
the statutory purpose. Second, a few additions have been deemed
necessary. As the statute appears below, the deletions are enclosed
in brackets and the additions are in italics.
§ 209. PUNISHMENT OF KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM, RE-
WARD, ETC.
ANY PERSON WHO [seizes, confines, inveigles, entices,
decoys, abducts, conceals, kidnaps, or carries away] KIDNAPS
(AS DEFINED IN SECTION 207), ANY INDIVIDUAL
BY ANY MEANS WHATSOEVER WITH INTENT TO HOLD
AND DETAIN, OR WHO HOLDS OR DETAINS, SUCH INDI-
82 60 Cal. 2d 631, 388 P.2d 33, 36 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1964).
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VIDUAL FOR RANSOM, REWARD OR TO COMMIT EXTOR-
TION OR TO EXACT FROM RELATIVES OR FRIENDS OF
SUCH PERSON ANY MONEY OR VALUABLE THING, [or
any person who kidnaps or carries away any individual to commit
robbery, or any person who aids or abets any such act,] IS GUILTY
OF A FELONY AND UPON CONVICTION THEREOF SHALL
[suffer death or shall] BE PUNISHED BY IMPRISONMENT IN
THE STATE PRISON FOR LIFE [without possibility of parole,
at the discretion of the jury trying the same] IN CASES IN
WHICH THE PERSON OR PERSONS SUBJECTED TO SUCH
KIDNAPPING SUFFERS OR SUFFER BODILY HARM OR
SHALL BE PUNISHED BY IMPRISONMENT IN THE STATE
PRISON FOR [life with possibility of parole] NOT LESS THAN
FIVE YEARS IN CASES WHERE SUCH PERSON OR PERSONS
DO NOT SUFFER BODILY HARM. [Any person serving a sen-
tence or imprisonment for life without possibility of parole following
a conviction under this section as it read prior to the effective date of
this act shall be eligible for a release on parole as if he had been sen-
tenced to imprisonment for life with possibility of parole.]
The first change merely eliminates a number of surplus synonyms
and replaces them with a reference to Penal Code Section 207.
Since for many years the definition of "kidnapping" in section 207
has been judicially applied to section 209, it seems logical to clearly
and specifically state that fact in the revised section 209.
There would also seem to be no necessity for the inclusion of the
language dealing with "aiding and abetting" since Penal Code
section 3 13 provides in its definition of principals that those who
"aid and abet in its commission ... are principals in any crime so
committed." This general section applies to all crimes enacted in
the Penal Code and encompasses section 209 as well; therefore, the
inclusion of this language is unnecessary and this surplusage could
well be striken without loss of meaning to the section itself.
The first substantive modification occurs where the penalty is
changed from death, or life imprisonment without possibility of
parole, to the lesser penalty of life imprisonment with a minimum
sentence of five years. As discussed in the previous section, this
change is warranted in order to align the crime of kidnapping for
ransom with the rationale that the punishment imposed under a
statute should bear some relation to the harm caused by the defen-
dant.
83 CAL. PEN. CODE § 31 (West 1955).
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Another change which logically follows from the recent case
law involves the provision for the jury's discretion in the penalty
proceedings. Under a strict interpretation of the language contained
in the present statute, the jury, rather than the court, has the exclu-
sive province of adjudicating punishment in those cases involving
bodily harm. On its face, the phraseology of this provision in 209
seems to imply that if the defendant waives a jury trial he in
effect waives the possibility of receiving anything other than the
death penalty, because the judge apparently has no discretion to
decree a sentence of a lesser magnitude than the extreme penalty.
California dealt with this problem in the recent opinion handed
down in People v. Langdon,84 where the defendant had waived a
jury and was thereafter sentenced to death. The California Supreme
Court held that the trial judge has the same discretionary powers
with regard to sentencing as is given the jury. The court further
held that notwithstanding the phrase "at the discretion of the
jury," the trial court could in fact impose the death sentence where
there has been an effective jury waiver. The court relied on Penal
Code section 190.185 which provides that in cases where the penalty
is in the alternative, either death or imprisonment for life, the "trier
of fact" shall then hear further proceedings "on the issue of
penalty." This reasoning, of course, must be engrafted onto the
specific language of section 209 to achieve the result reached by
the court. Similar wording in the federal kidnapping statute, 86 has
also caused concern, and there is authority reaching a result different
from that of the California Supreme Court. In United States v.
Jackson,17 it was held that that portion of the federal statute would
be violative of the sixth amendment right to trial by jury because
a different result may be achieved if the defendant exercises his
option and requests a jury trial. Such difficulties would be obviated
if the language were eliminated.
Lastly, it should be noted that the 1951 amendment to section
209 which added the second paragraph, was seemingly included to
prevent a disproportionate penalty to those convicted under the
pre-1951 "standstill robbery" concept. This situation, of course, has
been fully discussed in People v. Knowles.88 At the present time, all
84 52 Cal. 2d 425, 341 P.2d 303 (1959).
85 CAL. PEN. CODE § 190.1 (West 1959).
80 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1964).
87 262 F. Supp. 716 (1967).
88 35 Cal. 2d 175, 217 P.2d 1 (1950).
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such persons to whom this addition would be applicable most
probably have had their rights adjudicated, and such language would
no longer be necessary to the purposes of this section. Therefore, if
modification is contemplated or desired in connection with the
aggravated kidnapping section, language such as that described
herein should be omitted in any future statutory scheme, since it
adds little but confusion to the section.
In addition to the deletions from the current statute, two new
sections are necessary to correct the remaining defects.
§ 209.1 KIDNAPPING FOR ROBBERY-PUNISHMENT.
Any person who kidnaps any individual to commit robbery is guilty
of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall be punished as pro-
vided in section 209 of the Penal Code.
(a) Kidnapping for robbery as used in this section means any
movement of the victim of the robbery, or of any other person
present at the scene and not a perpetrator therein, against his will
and accomplished by means of force or threats to such person or
another where such movement extends a substantial distance,80
which distance exceeds movement within a stationary structure or
physical entity and which is intended to effectior aid in the com-
mission of the robbery or the escape of any of the perpetrators.
§ 209.2 DEFINITION OF BODILY HARM.
Bodily harm means that bodily injury which creates a substantial
risk of death, or which causes serious permanent disfigurement, or
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member
or organ.0o
Essentially, such provisions would at least eliminate the problems
of the present kidnapping-for-robbery portion of section 209. Spe-
cifically, part (a) would avoid the issue as to whether any move-
ment, no matter how slight, would constitute kidnapping when
coupled with a robbery. By requiring movement over a substantial
distance and defining this distance to be at least out of the structure
in which the action begins, the standard robbery situation is elimi-
nated from the purview of the kidnapping statute. If the victim is
not moved out of the "structure or physical entity" but such entity
is moved (e.g., a trailer, boat or car), the substantial distance rule
would be the only test. Admittedly, it is impossible to define "sub-
stantial distance" in exact terms, such as a given number of feet,
but it would at least consist of a distance greater than that normally
89 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1960).
90 Id. at § 211.4(3).
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incident to the lesser offense of robbery. Incidental movement asso-
ciated with the crime adds nothing to its severity, thus, to increase
the punishment solely because of that fact would seem to be arbitrary
and unreasonable.
A further addition is the section defining bodily harm. As previ-
ously indicated in this article, the Tanner case had all but equated
bodily harm with civil battery. Currently, the standard jury instruc-
tion in California requires the bodily harm to be "substantial," 91
and the Jackson case would seem to lend judicial support to this
addition. Substantial injury, if that be the law, is not enough. In
this author's view, the definition of bodily harm should be much
akin to that of mayhem wherein the victim is deprived of some
method or means of bodily function. The definition presented in the
proposed section 209.2 attempts to exclude from the statute's purview
sexual intercourse or other sexual misconduct, and simple assaults. I
believe that the existing penalties for rape and sexual misconduct
are adequate to meet the ends of justice under existing law. Section
209.2 for example, would prevent a rape without serious bodily
injury from being raised by a zealous prosecutor to a kidnapping
charge with the more extreme penalty than that delineated for rape.
While such statutory revision might not solve all the problems,
I think it would alleviate what must be a formidable problem con-
fronting our courts in the fair, efficient and prompt administration
of criminal justice.
91 CAL. J.l.C. § 655 (1958).
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